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We  construct  a  staggered-price  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  with  overlapping 
generations based on uncertain lifetimes. Price stickiness plus lack of Ricardian Equivalence 
could be expected to make an increase in government debt, with associated changes in lump-
sum taxation, effective in raising short-run output. However we find this is very sensitive to 
the monetary policy rule. A permanent increase in debt under a basic Taylor Rule does not 
raise output. To make debt effective we need either a temporary nominal interest rate peg; or 
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 1. Introduction 
The  recent  economic  crisis  has  witnessed  a  strong  reaction  of  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  to  support  the  economy.  In  many  developed  countries,  the  nominal  interest  rate 
reached  historically  low  levels.  Unconventional  monetary  policy  measures  were 
implemented, together with large fiscal stimulus packages causing a worsening of the fiscal 
imbalances.  A  legacy  of  the  crisis  so  far  has  been  large  deficits  and  major  increases  in 
government debt levels across the world. 
Not  surprisingly,  the  academic  literature  has  reacted  with  a  renewed  interest  in 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions. The main research question regards the size of the 
fiscal  multiplier  depending  on  the  particular  fiscal  instrument  used  and  on  the  state  of 
monetary policy. Given the historically low levels of the interest rate particular attention has 
been devoted to the effects of fiscal policy at a zero interest-rate bound. Eggertson (2009) and 
Christiano et al (2009) show that the fiscal multiplier can be much larger in this case. More 
generally, Woodford (2010) provides an insightful critical survey of this recent literature on 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions (See also Kirsanova et al., 2009).  
All the papers surveyed in Woodford (2010), however, employ the canonical ‘New 
Neoclassical  Synthesis’  (NNS)  model  for  monetary  policy  analysis.  This  embodies 
‘Ricardian Equivalence’, so that changes in government debt, when accompanied by changes 
in lump-sum taxation, have no real effects on the economy. Given the huge increase in debt 
which has recently occurred in many developed economies, we would like to have a model 
where government debt - and thus also government budget deficits financed by borrowing - 
has a more interesting and realistic role. In this paper, we thus consider a staggered-price 
model  where  Ricardian  Equivalence  does  not  hold  because  of  overlapping  generations 
(OLG). We then study monetary and fiscal policy interactions, showing how monetary policy 
is crucial in shaping the effects of a change in the debt level in this setting. It is worth noting 
from the outset that, in our framework (and as will be seen), it is the stock of government 
debt, rather than the size of the deficit, which provides the best single measure of the fiscal 
stance. Hence we focus on this variable as the primary fiscal instrument.   2 
A plausible hypothesis about the effect of fiscal policy in such an environment might be 
as follows. A one-period tax cut financed by an increase in government debt which is then 
held permanently at its new higher level would stimulate consumption demand. This is for 
the standard reason that, although agents would rationally anticipate higher future taxes to 
service the increased debt interest, a proportion of the taxes would fall on agents not yet born, 
so that currently-alive agents - the recipients of the tax cut - would perceive their lifetime 
wealth  to  have  risen.  In  the  presence  of  temporary  nominal  rigidities,  the  increase  in 
aggregate demand would then raise output in a typical Keynesian fashion. 
Below, we test this hypothesis by constructing a careful dynamic general equilibrium 
(DGE)  model  with  the  aforementioned  features.  Our  purpose  is  analytical  rather  than 
empirical: we are not seeking to match our model quantitatively to the data, but to understand 
qualitatively, and in depth, the economic forces at work. So far as possible we therefore 
proceed using algebra rather than numerical simulations, although we also make use of the 
latter. We start by applying the model to the basic fiscal policy experiment just described. 
Surprisingly, we do not find that an expansionary short-run effect on output is bound to 
occur. Indeed, in the baseline version of our analysis, a permanent increase in government 
debt has no short-run effect on output different from its (relatively insignificant) long-run 
effect. In other words, it causes neither boom nor slump. Such a policy measure is therefore 
completely ineffective in raising output. This is despite setting it in a macromodel which 
deliberately incorporates features which might be expected to give it some leverage. 
What is the explanation for this ineffectiveness? We show that the critical factor is the 
monetary policy regime. In our baseline case, we assume a Taylor Rule for monetary policy, 
i.e. a rule which makes the nominal interest rate a function of current inflation.
1 In recent 
years this has become the standard way to represent monetary policy, for reasons which have 
been widely discussed. In the c ase of a basic form of the Taylor Rule and a permanent 
increase in government debt, it is not possible to leave the parameters of the Taylor Rule 
unchanged if it is desired to ensure a particular level of long -run inflation, such as zero. The 
‘intercept’ term in the Taylor Rule has to be increased. This adjustment is the prima facie 
                                                 
1 We omit output from the Taylor Rule but its inclusion would not change the result.   3 
source of the neutralising effect on debt. A deeper discussion is presented in the body of the 
paper. 
This result is striking but one may ask how general it is. We hence proceed to explore 
ways of escaping from it. Firstly we seek to remain in a regime of Taylor Rules. Empirically 
realistic Taylor Rules allow for ‘interest-rate smoothing’, such that the nominal interest rate 
responds only gradually to changes in inflation and output. To study this analytically, we look 
at a monetary policy in which the nominal interest rate is pegged exogenously at its old level 
for one or more periods before the basic Taylor Rule takes over. We show that this delay in 
raising nominal interest rates also delays the rise in the real interest rate, and that this is 
crucial in enabling government debt to boost aggregate demand. We also allow for gradual 
adjustment using numerical simulation. We find that when this feature is incorporated, a 
short-run positive effect of a permanent debt increase on output is again restored. Another 
possible escape from fiscal ineffectiveness which we consider is to undertake a temporary 
rather than a permanent increase in government debt. Since the increase is temporary, it is 
feasible to leave the parameters of the Taylor Rule unchanged while still ensuring zero long-
run inflation. We show that a temporary increase in debt does increase short-run output even 
under the basic Taylor Rule. 
A second avenue for exploration is to consider what happens if monetary policy is 
instead conducted by fixing the money supply, which was the standard assumption until it 
was displaced by the Taylor Rule. In the later part of the paper we investigate this. A short-
run Keynesian boom once more re-emerges, both in response to a permanent increase in 
government debt, and also to a temporary increase. A comparison of this monetary regime 
with the Taylor Rule regime enables us to deepen our understanding of why debt can be 
ineffective  in  the  latter.  Under  interest-rate  control,  the  money  supply  is  an  endogenous 
variable. In the face of an increase in debt it jumps downward. This avoids the need for a 
period of inflation in order to reduce the stock of real money balances to its new long-run 
equilibrium level, and so avoids the need for a boom in output in order to generate such 
inflation.   4 
Other authors have studied fiscal policy, and its interaction with monetary policy, in 
‘non-Ricardian’ DGE models. In particular, various contributions by Leith and Wren Lewis 
(e.g.  2000,  2006,  2008)  have  covered  and  highlighted  many  issues.  To  our  knowledge, 
however, the potentially drastic effect of a Taylor Rule on the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
has not been noted before. A considerable number of papers have examined the determinacy 
of perfect-foresight equilibrium in DGE models with overlapping generations and money, 
with or without staggered prices and dynamics of government debt. These include Bénassy 
(2005, 2007b), Piergallini (2006), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) and Leith and von Thadden 
(2008). Bénassy (2007a) shows that fiscal policy can be effective in a simple Samuelson-type 
OLG model with one-period price rigidities. Galí et al. (2007) break Ricardian Equivalence 
by using ‘rule-of-thumb’ consumers and show that this can explain the econometric evidence 
of a positive effect of government spending on consumption. Finally, Chadha and Nolan 
(2007)  look  at  optimal  simple  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  rules  in  a  Blanchard-type 
framework. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The microeconomic assumptions are presented 
in Section 2. Section 3 examines the effectiveness of fiscal policy when monetary policy is 
governed by a Taylor Rule. Section 4 does the same when monetary policy is governed by a 
money-supply rule, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Structure of the Model 
The model brings together overlapping price setting in the manner of Calvo (1983) and 
overlapping generations in the manner of Blanchard (1985). Since we are interested in the 
qualitative features of such an economy rather than in quantitative matching of the data, we 
construct  the  model  as  sparingly  as  possible,  abstracting  from  elements  which  would 
complicate  the  dynamics  unnecessarily  and  increase  the  difficulty  of  understanding  the 
mechanisms  at  work. A DGE model  with  overlapping  generations  and  overlapping price 
setting  already  contains  numerous  intrinsic  sources  of  dynamics.  Amongst  the  elements 
omitted is capital accumulation. Although this is very commonly studied in conjunction with   5 
overlapping generations, our focus here is on short- to medium-run time spans during which 
changes in capital can reasonably be ignored. 
(i) Household behaviour 
We use a discrete-time version of Blanchard’s (1985) ‘perpetual youth’ overlapping 
generations model, in which agents have an exogenous probability, q (0 < q  1) of surviving 
to the next period. This well-known framework conveniently permits the average length of 
life to be parameterised and includes infinite lives as a special case, namely where q = 1. In 
order to have a demand for money and an endogenous supply  of labour we include real 
money balances and labour as arguments of the utility function. However the latter raises a 
potential difficulty, which is that if leisure is a ‘normal’ good a fraction of households will 
have  a  negative  labour  supply.  To  avoid  this  unsatisfactory  implication,  we  assume  a 
particular  utility  function  which  makes  labour  supply  wealth-independent,  as  discussed 
below. 
Specifically, the household’s optimisation problem may be stated as: 
maximise   
1
, , , ( ) ln [ / ] ( / )
tn
t n s t s t t s t q C M P L
     
  
    (1) 
subject to  , , , , 1 1 , 1 , (1/ )[ (1 ) ]
NN
t s t s t s t s t t s t t s t t t PC M B q M i B WL T            ,  (2) 
  for t = n,...,. 
Here, n is the current period and s ( n) is the household’s birth-period.  , st C  denotes the 
composite consumption in period t (defined below) of a household born in period s; and 
likewise  for  money  holdings  , st M ,  bond  holdings  ,
N
st B   and  labour  supply  , st L .  t P , t W , t i  
indicate the price index, wage, and nominal interest rate, respectively; while  t  , t T  denote 
profit receipts from firms and a lump-sum tax, which are assumed  age-independent. The 
parameters satisfy 0 < ,  < 1,  > 1,  > 0. Note also that, as in Blanchard (1985), the 
household receives an ‘annuity’ at the gross rate 1/q on its total financial wealth if it survives, 
this wealth passing to the insurance company if it dies. This is an actuarially fair scheme   6 
which nets out across the population so that in equilibrium the profits of insurance companies 
are zero. 
The  utility  function  (1)  is  a  modified  version  of  one  originating  with  Greenwood, 
Hercowitz  and  Huffman  (1988)  (‘GHH’).  The  modification  consists  in  introducing  real 
money  balances.  Its  implications  for  behaviour  can  be  seen  by  deriving  the  first-order 
conditions for the above problem, which are as follows: 
  , 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , , , , ( / ) ( / ) (1 ) ( / ) ( / ) s t t s t s t s t t s t t s t s t s t C P C M L r C PC M L
                    ,  (3) 
 
1
,, / (1 ) (1 )/ s t t s t t t M PC i i 
    ,  (4) 
 
11
, , , / (1 ) ( / ) t t t s t s t s t W P PC M L
 
  .  (5) 
Here,  1 t r   denotes 1 (1 ) / t t t i P P  , the real interest rate. It is also helpful to define money 
demand  per  unit  of  consumption,  ,, / s t t s t M PC ,  as  , st Z .  Then  (4)  shows  that  , st Z is 
independent of an agent’s birth date, s, and is a simple decreasing function of the nominal 
interest rate. From (5) we observe that an agent’s labour supply,  , st L , does not depend on his 
consumption except through  , st Z . Since  , st Z  is the same for all agents, labour supply is 
therefore also independent of s. This is our reason for using GHH preferences: it eliminates 
the income effect on labour supply which would otherwise arise through the presence of  , st C  
in (5),  , st C  being a variable which is  generally increasing with an agent’s age,  t-s. This 
enables us to avoid the problem of old agents having negative labour supply.
2 
Incorporating wealth-independent labour supply has a cost, however, which is that the 
utility function is not additively separable. One consequence is that there is a direct positive 
effect of real balances on labour supply, as can be seen from (5). This i s the ‘Brock effect’ 
(Brock (1974)). Intuitively, higher holdings of real balances (or higher  , st Z , to be precise) 
give the household an incentive to supply more labour since they complement consumption, 
raising the marginal utility of the latter. We would not expect this effect to be empirically 
important but since it is present we should be mindful of it when trying to understand the 
                                                 
2 This issue is discussed in more detail in Ascari and Rankin (2007). The utility function used here is first 
proposed there.   7 
model’s properties.
3 Non-separability also introduces direct effects of labour supply and of 
real balances on consumption. This can be seen from the presence of  , st L  and  , st Z in (3), 
which is a version of the Euler equation for consumption. The composite term  ,, ( / ) s t s t ZL
 
 , 
which is subtracted from both sides of (3), acts like a ‘subsistence’ level of consumption. In 
our model the Euler equation can be viewed as determining the growth rate of ‘adjusted’ 
consumption, where the latter is defined as actual consumption minus its subsistence level. 
For the reasons given above, subsistence consumption is independent of age. 
Although  households  of  different  ages  choose  the  same  labour  supply  and  money 
demand per unit of consumption, in general they will have different lifetime wealth levels 
and choose different consumption levels. Other things being equal, households who have the 
good  fortune  to  live  longer  will  have  higher  wealth,  and  there  will  be  a  distribution  of 
consumption and wealth across the population in any period. For aggregate consumption to 
be  a  function  only  of  aggregate  wealth  (and  of  relative  prices),  and  thus  for  it  to  be 
independent  of  the  shape  of  the  wealth  distribution,  it  is  necessary  that  an  individual 
household’s consumption be linear in its total lifetime wealth. For the utility function (1), we 
can confirm that this is the case. We thus preserve the feature that made easy aggregation 
possible in the original Blanchard (1985) paper. 
Given the above, we can derive a counterpart of the individual Euler equation, (5), in 
which individual is replaced by aggregate consumption: 
  1 1 1 ( / ) (1 ) ( / ) (1 )(1 )(1/ 1) t t t t t t t t C Z L r C Z L q q V
          

             .  (6) 
Absence of an ‘s’ subscript indicates an aggregate value (or, equivalently, an average value, 
since the population size is one). The relationship of a generic aggregate variable, Xt, to its 
constituent individual variables, Xs,t, is  , (1 )
t t s
t s s t X q q X

   . In the cases of Z and L we 
have already seen that individual and aggregate values are the same, but this is not generally 
true in the case of consumption. Nor is it true in the case of financial wealth, Vt, which, for an 
individual, is defined as the sum of his money and bond holdings in real terms: 
                                                 
3 Obviously the Brock effect would be absent in a ‘cashless’ model. However, we need to have money in our 
model because we want to investigate also the case of a money supply rule, to show how the choice of the 
monetary policy instrument influences the effect of fiscal policy.   8 
  , , 1 1 , 1 (1/ )[ (1 ) ]/ s t s t t s t t V q M i B P       .
4  (7) 
The  ‘aggregate  Euler  equation’,  (6),  says  that  the  growth  rate  of  aggregate  adjusted 
consumption depends positively on the real interest rate (as in the case of individual adjusted 
consumption), and (to the extent that q < 1) negatively on aggregate financial wealth. A 
similar relationship is found in Blanchard (1985) and other applications of the ‘perpetual 
youth’  model.  The  negative  influence  of  financial  wealth  arises  from  the  ‘generational 
turnover effect’.
5 Such an effect occurs because some old agents are replaced by newborn 
agents between t and t+1, and in general the newborn, since they have no financial wealth, 
have lower consumption than old agents, who have had time to accumulate it over their 
lifetimes. 
It remains to define composite consumption. We assume a continuum of types of good, 
indexed by i  [0,1]. The household has CES utility over good types, given by: 
 
/( 1) 1 ( 1)/
, 0 , , s t i s t C C di
       ,       > 1.  (8) 
The subsidiary part of its optimisation problem is to allocate spending amongst good types to 
maximise  (8)  subject  to  a  budget  constraint 
1
0 , , , , i t i s t s t P C di I  ,  where  , st I   is  its  income 
available to spend on goods. This leads to the familiar constant-elasticity demand function for 
good type i: 
  , , , , ( / ) ( / ) i s t i t t s t t C P P I P
         where 
1/(1 ) 11
0, t i t P P di
       .  (9) 
Moreover, at an optimum,  ,, / s t s t t C I P  . 
(ii) Firm behaviour 
Firms are monopolistic competitors who produce differentiated goods. As an input they 
use labour hired in  a competitive market. Price staggering is introduced through Calvo’s 
                                                 
4 The relationship of aggregate to individual financial wealth is slightly different from the general one just 
given, being, rather,  (1/ ) (1 ) ,
t t s q V q q V t s s t
    . This is because we have included the annuity payout in our 
definition of Vs,t. Such a payout does not apply to the aggregate variable since it is a redistribution from those 
who die to those who survive. 
5 This effect is so named by Heijdra and Ligthart (2000).   9 
(1983) mechanism, in which a firm is allowed to adjust its nominal price with probability 1- 
in any period, while it has to keep it fixed with probability . The optimisation problem of a 
firm, i, which receives the opportunity to adjust its price in period n, can thus be stated as: 
maximise    ,, / n t n n t i t t EP

      (10) 
where  , , , , i t i t i t t i t P Y W L    , 
 
1 1 1
, 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) ...(1 ) n t n n t r r r
  
            (with  , 1 nn  ), 
subject to  ,, i t i t YL
        0 <   1,  (11) 
  ,, ( / ) i t i t t t Y P P Y
   ,  (12) 
  , , 1 i t i t PP         with probability ,  (13) 
  for t = n,...,. 
Here,  , it Y , , it P , , it L  are the output, price and labour input of firm i. Wt is the wage and  , nt   is 
the discount factor. The demand for good i is given by (12), which is the aggregation across 
all households of their individual demands, (9), plus the demand from the government (see 
below). Being infinitesimal relative to the economy as a whole, the firm treats the macro 
variables which shift its demand function, Yt and Pt, as given. It also treats Wt as given. This 
is a standard set-up in New Neoclassical Synthesis models. The nominal rigidity combined 
with  monopolistic  competition  generates  the  Keynesian  feature  that  output  is  demand-
determined. This is because firms will always prefer to satisfy any unexpected increase in 
demand, given that price will have been set above marginal cost as a result of the firm’s 
monopoly power.  
Solving the optimisation problem yields the following expression for firm i’s ‘new’ or 
‘reset’ price: 
 





t n n t t t t
n tn














   
.  (14)   10 
‘Xn’ denotes the new price set in period n. Symmetry amongst firms means that all firms able 
to change their prices in period n will choose the same new price, so that no ‘i’ subscript is 
needed. (14) is a forward-looking price-setting rule typical of models with Calvo-style price 
staggering.  It  says  that  the  new  price  depends  on  current  and  expected  future  values  of 
aggregate output, the general price level and the wage level. 
The general formula for the price index was given in (9). Combining this with the Calvo 
pricing assumption, we obtain an expression for the price index as a function of current and 





t j t j PX
  
 
      .  (15) 
This arises from the fact that, of all the prices in force in period t, the fraction which were last 
reset exactly j periods ago is (1-)
j. 
(iii) Government behaviour 
The government’s budget constraint in nominal terms is: 
  1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )
N N N
t t t t t t t t t P G T i B B B M M           ,  (16) 
where  Gt  is  purchases  of  firms’  outputs,  measured  in  terms  of  the  composite  good.  We 
assume government spending on good i, Git, is determined by a demand function analogous 
to a household’s demand function, (9), and with the same price elasticity. 
Defining the real value of government bonds as  /
N
t t t B B P  , we can rewrite the budget 
constraint in real terms as: 
  1 1 1 (1 ) ( )/ t t t t t t t t G T B r B M M P          .  (17) 
Clearly, only three of the four policy instruments, (Gt,Tt,Bt,Mt), can be chosen independently 
in any period t. Below, we always take Gt to be fixed at some exogenous, time-invariant, 
value, G. We take the  second independent  fiscal  instrument  to  be real government  debt,   11 
inclusive  of  interest,  which  we  denote  as  (1 ) t t t B r B   .
6  With  either  Mt  or  it  being 
determined by the monetary policy rule (see below), this leaves the lump-sum tax, Tt, to be 
determined by (17) as the residual instrument of policy. Such a fiscal regime allows us easily 
to study the effects of simple types of change in the level of government debt. It is not our 
goal here to study an empirically ‘realistic’ fiscal regime: for example, one that incorporates 
‘automatic fiscal stabilisers’, making Gt and Tt functions of output; or one that involves rules 
limiting the government deficit or debt levels to some percentage of GDP. Other authors (e.g. 
Leith  and  Wren-Lewis,  op.  cit.)  have  studied  such  regimes  using  models  similar  to  the 
present  one,  but  these  have  the  drawback  that  several  policy  instruments  are  changing 
simultaneously,  so  that  numerous  effects  become  intertwined.  Instead  our  objective  is  to 
conduct  simple  fiscal  experiments  which  will  elucidate  the  mechanics  of  how  the 
macroeconomy  is  affected.  Amongst  other  things,  by  choosing  the  time  path  of  t B 
exogenously,  we  remove  endogenous  changes  in  the  stock  of  government  debt  as  an 
additional source of dynamics. 
(iv) Market-clearing conditions 
Equilibrium in the goods market requires that: 
  t t t Y C G  .  (18) 
This version of the equation is for the composite good, but a similar relationship also holds 
for every good, i. 
To write down the condition for equilibrium in the labour market, we first need the 
aggregate  demand  for  labour.  The  derivation  of  this  is  given  in  Appendix  A.  Equating 
aggregate labour demand to aggregate labour supply, where the latter is given by the inverse 
of (5) (dropping the ‘s’ subscript, for reasons explained), we have: 
 
1/( 1) 1/ / 1 ( / ) (1 ) / t t t t t t Y P P Z W P
     
     .  (19) 
                                                 
6 Government debt should therefore be thought of as ‘indexed’ debt. More precisely, Bt is the number of ‘real 
treasury bills’ issued, i.e. it is a promise to deliver Bt units of the composite consumption good to the holders of 
the bonds at the start of period t+1.   12 
Here,  t P  is a price index very similar to  t P  - see again Appendix A. Below, in order to study 
the  macroeconomic  implications  of  the  model,  we  take  a  loglinear  approximation  to  its 
equations. When we do this it turns out that, locally,  t P  =  t P , in which case  t P  drops out of 
(19). In fact, the aggregate labour demand function on the LHS of (19) is then simply the 
inverse production function applied to aggregate output, as can easily be seen. 
Equilibrium in the bond market requires that the exogenous, government-determined 
stock of bonds should equal the aggregate demand for them by households. At this point, note 
that aggregate financial wealth can be written as: 
  1 / t t t t V M P B    .  (20) 
The  t B  component  is  exogenous  under  our  fiscal  policy  regime.  The  other  component, 
Mt/Pt+1, is endogenous, and in money-market equilibrium this must equal money demand as 
given by the aggregate version of (4). 
(v) Steady-state general equilibrium 
It is useful at this point to note some features of the steady-state equilibrium in which 
all aggregate real variables are constant over time. We consider only steady states with zero 
inflation since, later, the monetary policy regime will be constructed to ensure long-run price 
stability. 
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(Absence of a time subscript denotes a steady-state value.) From this we see that, in the long 
run, output is positively related to money demand per unit of consumption, Z. The reason for 
this  is  the  ‘Brock  effect’  mentioned  earlier:  higher  equilibrium  real  balances  raise  the 
marginal utility of consumption, due to non-separability of the utility function, which in turn 
stimulates  households  to  increase  labour  supply.  Note  that  in  the  steady  state  prices  are 
effectively perfectly flexible, whence steady-state output is determined by the ‘supply side’   13 
of the model. The Brock effect will be weak to the extent that  is small, and empirically we 
would expect  to be close to zero. (21) also demonstrates that there is no direct effect of 
government debt, B, on steady-state output. This is despite the fact that under overlapping 
generations, i.e. q < 1, government bonds are ‘net wealth’ for households, i.e. despite the fact 
that Ricardian Equivalence does not hold (as will be seen in another context below). The 
explanation is that the ‘modified GHH’ utility function has eliminated the wealth effect on 
labour supply. Were such an effect present, an increase in B would directly reduce output by 
increasing the demand for leisure. In fact, an increase in B does reduce steady-state output in 
our model, but through the indirect channel of reducing Z, as will be shown later. 
A second important relationship is the steady-state version of (6), the ‘aggregate Euler 
equation’: 
  1 1/ (1 )(1/ )(1/ 1) / r q q V A          .  (22) 
‘A’  here  denotes  ‘adjusted  consumption’,  as  defined  above.  (22)  makes  clear  that,  with 
infinitely-lived  agents  (q  =1),  the  long-run  real  interest  rate  is  simply  equal  to  the  time 
preference rate, 1/ -1. However, with overlapping generations (q < 1), the real interest rate 
exceeds 1/ -1, the size of the gap depending positively on the ratio of financial assets to 
adjusted consumption. Intuitively, this is because (22) is the (inverse) ‘demand function for 
financial assets’. A high value of r causes households to choose a positive ‘tilt’ to their 
lifetime consumption profiles, and since they have time-invariant labour incomes in a steady 
state, in order to achieve this they need to accumulate financial assets during their lifetimes. 
In the aggregate, such behaviour generates a positive demand for financial assets as a store of 
value,  and  this  demand  is  increasing  in  r.  From  (22)  we  can  also  see  how  Ricardian 
Equivalence fails when q < 1. Notice that an increase in the stock of government debt, B, 
adds to V and thus raises r. (For the moment consider, M/P, the other component of V, as 
given.) This means that when q < 1 government debt affects real variables and so is clearly 
‘non-neutral’. However, what remains to be seen is the form which this non-neutrality takes 
in full general equilibrium.   14 
In  a  zero-inflation  steady  state  where  B  =  G  =  0,  we  can  derive  the  following 
completely reduced-form solution for r: 
   
1 2 1/2
2 1/ 1 [(1/ 1 ) 4 ] r               (23) 
where 
1 (1/ )(1/ 1) [1 (1 ) ( 1)/ ] qq       
       .
7 We can easily see from (23) that 
when  = 0, r = 1/ -1; while when  > 0, r > 1/ -1. One special case in which  = 0 is when 
q = 1, which is the result noted above. However, another special case in which  = 0 is in the 
limit as   0. It is useful to understand why this occurs. As   0, the demand for real 
balances tends to zero, as is apparent from (4). The equilibrium level of real balances  is 
determined by the demand for them, since even if the nominal money stock M is exogenous 
what matters is the money stock divided by the price level, and the latter is endogenous. 
Since we have already assumed that B = 0 in deriving (23), it can be seen that by letting  
tend to zero we reduce the total stock of financial assets, V, to zero. The earlier equation (22) 
tells us that, even if q < 1, in such an extreme case the real interest rate will still simply equal 
the time preference rate. The intuitive reason for this is that if the supply of financial assets is 
zero, then for the market to clear the demand for them must also be zero, and to achieve this 
the real interest rate must be driven down to the time preference rate. 
(vi) A loglinearised and partially-reduced form of the model 
In order to permit algebraic investigation of the model’s properties, we now loglinearise 
its equations. The ‘reference’ steady state about which we take the loglinear approximation is 
that in which inflation, government spending and government debt are all zero. The value of 
the real interest rate in this steady state is given by (23). Since it appears frequently as part of 
the coefficients of the loglinearised equations, we henceforth denote it as rR. 
Appendix B provides a complete list of the underlying loglinearised equations. In the 
New Neoclassical  Synthesis model to  which ours is  closely  related, the standard way of 
combining  these  equations  is  in  the  form  of  a  ‘New  Keynesian  Phillips  Curve’  (NKPC) 
                                                 
7 (23) is the larger of the two solutions of a quadratic equation. We discard the smaller solution because it 
implies that r, and thus i, is negative, which is economically meaningless.   15 
equation and an ‘IS’ equation. So far as possible, we adopt the same approach here. This 
yields the following equations (derived in Appendix B): 
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1 (1 ) [ ( / 1) ] t R t t t r y z      

      ,  (24) 
 
1
11 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) tt yz    

       
   
1 (1 ) [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) R t t r y z     
         
  1 1 1
1 ˆ (1 ) ( ) (1 ) R t t R t r i r v     
  
      ,  (25) 
 
1ˆ () t t t t R t z m p y r i
      ,  (26) 
  1 t t t t v m p b      .  (27) 
Unless  otherwise  stated,  lower-case  variables  are  the  log-deviations  of  their  upper-case 
counterparts; e.g. yt  ln Yt - ln YR (where ‘R’ denotes the value in the reference steady state). 
pt is just defined as ln Pt and the rate of inflation as t  pt - pt-1. The interest rate variables are 
defined as  ˆ
t i   ln(1+it) - ln(1+iR),  ˆ t r   ln(1+rt) - ln(1+rR). In the case of debt, since  R B   0, 
the log-deviation of  t B is not well defined; hence we use  ( )/ t t R R b B B V     . In the above and 
henceforth we also set government spending, Gt, permanently to zero; hence yt and ct are the 
same  variable.  Two  new  composite  parameters  which  appear  here  are 
1 1 1 (1 )[ (1 ) ](1 / ) ( / 1) R r        
           and 
1 [1 (1 )(1 1/ ) / ]     
     , which 
are both positive. 
(24) is the NKPC equation for our model, giving inflation as an increasing function of 
current output and of expected future inflation. It essentially derives from the price-setting 
and  price  index  equations,  (14)  and  (15),  together  with  the  condition  for  labour  market 
clearing, (19). Compared to the standard model, its novel feature is the inclusion of zt, which 
is the result of the ‘Brock effect’ of real balances in stimulating labour supply, as discussed 
earlier. (25) is the IS equation which, as in the related literature, derives from the Euler 
equation for consumption. One of its distinctive features here is the inclusion of financial 
wealth, vt. This is the result of the ‘generational turnover’ effect on aggregate consumption, 
as  explained  above.  Another  distinctive  feature  is  the  presence  of  zt  and  zt+1.  These  are   16 
additional  consequences  of  non-additively-separable  utility,  which  causes  Zt  to  be  a 
component of ‘adjusted consumption’, as seen above. Having noted that zt enters the NKPC 
and IS equations, it is clear that our model, unlike the standard model, cannot be solved 
without also using the LM equation, given by (26). By substituting the LM equation into (24) 
and (25) we can eliminate zt, introducing further instances of  ˆ
t i . 
The system consisting of (24)-(27) still does not provide a complete description of the 
economy’s time path because it remains to add a monetary policy rule. In the next section we 
do this using a Taylor Rule for the interest rate, and we study the macroeconomic behaviour 
which results. In the following section we re-work the analysis assuming instead a simple 
rule for the money supply. 
 
3. Fiscal Policy when Monetary Policy is Governed by a Taylor Rule 
The standard way to represent monetary policy in recent years has been to assume that 
the nominal interest rate is set as a function of the inflation rate and of output. The best 
known example of such a rule is that of Taylor (1993). In our log-deviation notation, such a 
rule could be expressed as: 
  ˆ
t t y t i i y        .  (28) 
Here,     and  y   are positive feedback parameters. In fact, in what follows, we shall simplify 
by assuming  y   = 0. This reduces the amount of algebra while not affecting the main results. 
i  is the ‘intercept term’ and represents the value of the (nominal and real) interest rate 
in a steady state with zero inflation. In the standard, infinite-lives (q =1) model, the steady-
state real interest rate r is simply given by r = 1/ -1, as already noted. Using the ‘deviation’ 
measure it is given by  ˆ r = 0. Zero steady-state inflation is thus obtained by setting  i  = 0. 
This can easily be seen from (28), which when  y   = 0 implies  ˆ ˆ( ) ( 1) r i i           in 
the  steady  state.  However,  in  the  overlapping-generations  (q  <  1)  model,  ˆ r   has  a  more 
complex set of determinants, amongst which is the level of government debt. The level at 
which  i  needs to be set in order to ensure zero steady-state inflation is therefore endogenous   17 
and remains to be calculated: it will simply be whatever is the associated level of the steady-
state real interest rate. 
3.1 A permanent debt increase under the basic Taylor Rule 
We first consider a fiscal policy experiment in which the economy is at the reference 
steady state in period t = 0, and then in t = 1 the government raises the stock of debt,  t b, to 
some positive value, b, and holds it there permanently. This implies that there is a cut in 
taxation,  t,  in  period  1,  and  hence  a  budget  deficit  which  lasts  for  one  period  only. 
Thereafter, taxation is raised to whatever level is required to restore the budget to balance and 
to keep it there. 
We start our analysis of this policy by examining the properties of the new steady state 
with which the higher debt level is associated. The question of whether and how the economy 
converges to this steady state is addressed subsequently. The Taylor Rule itself plays no role 
in determining the steady state other than via our assumption that it is parameterised to ensure 
steady-state inflation is zero. Hence for now we do not need (28) but we will return to it when 
considering the dynamics. 
Proposition  1.  A  permanent  government  debt  increase.  (i)  When  q  <  1,  a 
permanently higher government debt increases the steady-state interest rate (real as well as 
nominal, since inflation is zero) and reduces steady-state output. When q = 1 these effects are 
zero, and Ricardian Equivalence holds. (ii) Under a Taylor rule like (28), there are no short-
run  effects  on  output  different  from  the  long-run  effects,  because  the  system  entails  an 
immediate jump to the new steady state with no transitional dynamics. 
To prove part (i), first we use the system (24)-(27) to solve for the new steady state 
values. In doing so, we substitute out mt - pt+1 from vt as zt + yt - t+1. Setting variables to 
time-invariant values and  to zero, we then have four equations in (y, ˆ i ,z,v). From these we 
can solve explicitly for the steady-state values (y, ˆ i ) as functions of the government debt 
level, b (see Appendix C): 
   
1
11 (1 ) 1 [ (1 ) 1] R R R y r r r b         

             ,  (29)   18 
   
1
1 1 1 ˆ (1 ) 1 [ (1 ) 1] R R R i r r r b           

                .  (30) 
Four new composite parameters are introduced in these expressions, namely: 
 
1 1 1 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) R r     
        ,      
11 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] (1 ) R r     
      , 
 
11 [1 (1 )(1 1/ )] [ (1 ) 1] R r     
       ,      
11 ( / 1) R r     
 . 
,  and  are unambiguously positive.  is positive if q < 1 and zero if q = 1, since then 1+rB 
> 1/ or = 1/, respectively, as noted above. The signs of the coefficients on b in (29) and 
(30) can be seen to depend on the sign of the bracketed term {.}. {.} is common to both 
expressions and its sign is at first glance ambiguous. However the sign can in fact be resolved 
to be negative, as we show in Appendix C. Then part (i) of Proposition 1 follows. 
That higher government debt should raise the real interest rate is to be expected, since it 
is a standard result in other overlapping-generations models (e.g. Diamond (1965), Blanchard 
(1985)).  It  occurs  because,  as  noted,  overlapping  generations  give  rise  to  a  steady-state 
demand for financial assets which is increasing in the interest rate. Hence when the supply of 
such assets is expanded by increasing b, the interest rate has to rise to clear the asset market. 
The finding that output falls is perhaps less expected, especially since there is no capital in 
our model. One might be tempted to guess that it occurs because the increased bond stock, 
being  perceived  as  ‘net  wealth’  by  households,  increases  the  demand  for  leisure  and  so 
reduces labour supply. However, this is not correct, since our use of GHH preferences has 
removed the wealth effect on labour supply. Instead, the mechanism is the Brock effect: the 
increased nominal interest rate reduces the equilibrium stock of real money balances, which 
then reduces the marginal utility of consumption and the incentive to supply labour. We 
would not expect this effect to be empirically large because , the weight on real balances in 
the utility function, is likely to be close to zero in a realistic calibration. 
To prove part (ii), next consider the perfect-foresight transition path to the steady state 
following the once-and-for-all increase in government debt. Writing the economy’s laws of 
motion in a relatively compact form, we have:   19 
  1 ˆ (1 )[ ] t R t t t r y i          ,  (31) 
 
1
1 1 1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 )( ) ( ) ( ) t t R t t t t t R t t t y i r y i i y r i b       

               ,  (32) 
  ˆ
tt ii    .  (33) 
This  system  has  been  obtained  from  (24)-(27).  (The  definitions  of  (,,,)  were  given 
above.) (31) and (32) can be understood as slightly more reduced-form expressions for the 
NKPC and IS equations, respectively. Relative to the standard versions of these equations, 
the differences are, firstly, the term in  in the IS, which is present when q < 1 and represents 
the generational turnover effect; and, secondly, the terms in  and  in the NKPC and IS 
(respectively), which arise from non-separability of the utility function. 
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 is the benchmark result of the paper and one can see why it 
holds simply by inspecting the system (31)-(33). Note that (31) and (32), with  ˆ
t i  governed by 
(33), constitute a pair of simultaneous first-order difference equations in (t,yt). t and yt are 
both non-predetermined variables. Therefore, for a determinate perfect-foresight equilibrium 
to exist, we need the two eigenvalues of the system to lie outside the unit circle. We shall 
discuss further this condition below, but for the moment let us assume that it holds. Now 
notice that if the economy is initially in a steady state with b = 0 (and hence  = y = 0), and 
then, in t = 1,  t b is raised to some positive value b and held there permanently, then there is 
no time-variation in any exogenous variable of the system over the interval t = 1,...,. This is 
because the only exogenous fiscal policy variable in (31)-(32) is  t b, and by assumption it is 
held constant at b for t = 1,...,. It then follows that the economy must jump immediately to 
its new steady state. This means that the impact effect on output, inflation and all other 
endogenous  variables  is  the  same  as  the  long-run  effect.  In  other  words,  despite  price 
stickiness and the lack of Ricardian Equivalence, the attempt to give a short-run Keynesian 
stimulus to output fails. Output moves straight to its new steady-state level which, as seen 
above, is lower - even if not much lower - than its initial level. The inflation rate, for its part, 
stays at zero in every period, and hence the price level does not change.   20 
Everything we have said above holds only if the system admits a determinate perfect-
foresight equilibrium. Similarly to what was found in some other studies, Proposition 2 states 
that the determinacy condition is different in an OLG setup, relative to the standard NNS 
model. 
Proposition 2. Determinacy of the perfect-foresight equilibrium. Let y = 0 in (28). 
Then the minimum value of  needed to induce determinacy is increasing in the degree of 
price stickiness under overlapping generations (q < 1). 
As is  usual, determinacy  requires  that the Taylor Rule parameter   be sufficiently 
large. Under infinite lives (q = 1), this condition would be simply  > 1. Appendix D, on the 
other hand, shows that the condition for determinacy under overlapping generations (q < 1) 
can be depicted as follows 
 
For high degrees of price stickiness (high , and thus low ), a value of  much greater than 
one may be needed for determinacy. Conversely, for low degrees of price stickiness (low , 








region   21 
In  the  related  literature,  Bénassy  (2005)  finds  that  the  magnitude  of  the  feedback 
coefficient on inflation becomes irrelevant for determinacy when overlapping generations are 
introduced. However he assumes a different fiscal policy to ours, in which the total nominal 
stock of government liabilities (bonds plus money) is held constant over time. Piergallini 
(2006),  meanwhile,  finds  that  overlapping  generations  relax  the  normal  Taylor  Principle, 
independently of the degree of price stickiness. 
To  give  a  specific  illustration  of  the  above  effects  of  higher  t b,  we  carried  out  a 
numerical simulation exercise. For this we used the full non-linear model. This also provides 
reassurance that the result does not depend on the use of linear approximation. The equations 
and the calibration of the non-linear model are described in detail in Appendix E. Figure 1 
gives  the  impulse  response  functions  for  a  policy  experiment  in  which  t b  is  increased 
permanently from zero to a value equal to 1% of pre-shock GDP. In addition to confirming 
the analytical results already discussed, Figure 1 shows that the nominal and real money 
supply  fall.  Nevertheless  total  real  financial  wealth  rises,  the  fall  in  real  balances  being 
dominated by the increase in government debt. 
What  is  the  intuitive  explanation  for  the  fiscal  ineffectiveness?  As  we  will  show 
subsequently, the result is highly sensitive to the monetary policy regime, and thus to the use 
of the basic Taylor Rule. Note that under the basic Taylor Rule, the intercept term  i  jumps 
up immediately when debt is increased. This is needed, as pointed out above, to keep steady-
state inflation at zero. Intuitively, then, there is an induced response in the setting of the 
interest  rate  which  instantly  wipes  out  any  positive  effect  of  debt  on  aggregate  demand. 
Viewed in terms of a simplified version of the IS equation, (32), we can think of ‘current’ 
output,  yt,  as  being  determined  by  expected  future  output,  yt+1,  by  the  real  interest  rate 
1 ˆ
tt i     and by government debt  t b. (For heuristic purposes ignore the terms in  and the 
real-balance term yt- 1ˆ
Rt ri
 -t+1.) Moreover we can loosely treat yt+1 as exogenous because, 
relative to current output, future output is less affected by price stickiness and aggregate 
demand, and more by the economy’s supply side. From this simplified perspective, then, a 
rise in debt will raise current output unless it is offset by a rise in the real interest rate. The 
latter is what happens in the new steady state. In our policy experiment, however, this rise in   22 
the real interest rate in fact occurs immediately. What makes this immediate rise in the real 
interest  rate  possible,  despite  the  unchanged  inflation,  is  the  upward  jump  in  the  Taylor 
Rule’s  intercept  term  and  thus  in  the  nominal  interest  rate.  Another  view  of  this  is  the 
following. Elsewhere it has been shown that the Taylor Rule is effective for stabilising output 
in the face of random shocks. To use it in this way, the authorities need to adjust the intercept 
term to match, one-for-one, fluctuations in the ‘natural’ rate of interest.
 8 The present result 
shows that this idea remains valid when the shock is a change in government debt, and not 
just, for example, a change in productivity or preferences. Even though the debt increase is a 
deliberate fiscal policy change, the Taylor Rule neutralises its effect on output just as if it 
were a random private-sector disturbance. 
3.2 A permanent debt increase under a Taylor Rule with interest-rate inertia 
If the immediate increase in the Taylor Rule’s intercept term, and thus in the nominal 
interest rate, is what neutralises the output effect of the debt increase, this would suggest that 
a way of restoring fiscal policy effectiveness is to avoid the increase in the intercept term. It 
cannot be avoided forever, because if the long-run inflation rate is to remain at zero, there 
must eventually be a rise in the intercept term, for the reason explained earlier. However, 
what could be done is that the increase in the nominal interest rate could be delayed. Indeed, 
this scenario appears to capture well what happened in many western economies in the recent 
crisis,  where  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  was  assisted  by  monetary  policy  keeping  the 
interest rate at historically low levels. 
Assume  for  the  moment  that  monetary  policy  pegs  the  nominal  interest  rate 
exogenously at its original level for one or more periods at the start of the fiscal expansion, 
before reverting to the Taylor Rule, (28). This simple assumption about the inertial response 
of monetary policy allows us to derive analytical results. This is because, if the Taylor Rule is 
restored from period t = T onwards, we know that the economy will be in its new steady state 
from period t = T onwards. If the debt increase occurs in period T-1, we can then solve 
backwards in time to find the effect on yT-1. Indeed, if the debt increase occurs in period T-2, 
                                                 
8 See for example Woodford (2003), Ch. 4.   23 
or T-3, etc., we can extend the solution further backwards. The results are summarized in 
Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3. A permanent government debt increase with a delayed interest rate 
response. Under a temporary interest-rate peg, the debt increase causes a boom in output in 
the impact period. In the case of a multi-period peg, the size of the impact boom is increasing 
in the number of periods that the interest rate is pegged, and the boom dies away as the 
moment for the Taylor Rule to be re-instated approaches. 
Although we can derive these results algebraically, for brevity we shall not present the 
proofs here.
9 Instead in Figure 2 we provide an illustration from a numerical simulation of the 
non-linear model (using the same parameter values as before) in which the nominal interest 
rate is kept fixed for 8 periods. It is clear that, far from immediately jumpin g upwards to its 
new, higher, long-run value, the real interest rate under such a policy must fall (relative to its 
original value) during the period of the interest rate peg, since there is inflation during this 
period. It is this which avoids the expansionary effect of government debt from being offset, 
and hence a short-run boom in output does now emerge. Indeed the fall in the real interest 
rate reinforces the boom. Referring to our earlier intuitive discussion in terms of a simplified 
IS relationship, the fact that the real interest rate is prevented from immediately attaining its 
new,  higher,  steady-state  value  is  what  permits  the  increase  in  debt  to  boost  current 
consumption demand and thus output. 
More generally, it has often been noted that in practice central banks typically adjust 
interest rates only gradually. Accordingly, empirical studies of interest-rate setting find that, 
in place of (28), a relationship such as 
  1 ˆˆ (1 )( ) t t y t t i i y i               (0   < 1)  (34) 
fits the data better, where  captures the degree of nominal interest-rate inertia. 
The use of a Taylor Rule with inertia introduces a predetermined state variable into the 
model. Its laws of motion are now given by (31), (32) and (34) (in which we shall again set y 
=  0).  The  dynamics  become  third-order,  and  thus  relatively  complicated.  Numerical 
                                                 
9 They are available upon request.   24 
simulation  is  the  easiest  way  of  investigating  the  properties  of  such  a  system  quickly. 
Accordingly, Figure 3 shows a simulation of the effects of the same permanent debt increase 
as before, for the case where  = 0.9. It can be seen that a short-run boom in output occurs in 
this case too, dying away asymptotically. Again, the key to ‘releasing’ this expansionary 
effect is the sluggish response of the nominal interest rate, and thus also of the real interest 
rate.  Inertia  in  the  Taylor  Rule  thus  makes  a  crucial  difference  to  the  effectiveness  of 
government debt in influencing aggregate demand. Investigation of other parameter values 
shows that the inertia needs to be substantial in order for this to work. For example, if  = 
0.3, then there is no short-run boom: there is merely a delay in output falling from its original 
level to its new, slightly lower, steady-state level. 
Therefore, despite the negative ‘benchmark’ result in Proposition 1, our model can still 
explain how the ‘fiscal stimulus’ policy pursued by many governments in the 2008-9 ‘credit 
crunch’ recession almost certainly did contribute to alleviating that recession. During the 
recession,  central  banks  cooperated  with  governments  to  keep  the  nominal  interest  rate 
pegged  at  a  value  close  to  zero,  rather  than  raising  it  in  the  face  of  a  big  increase  in 
government  debt.  Had  they  done  the  latter,  the  expansionary  benefits  would  have  been 
completely lost. 
3.3 A temporary debt increase under the basic Taylor Rule 
If the aim of fiscal policy is to stabilise output fluctuations in the face of temporary 
business  cycle  shocks,  then  any  increase  in  the  level  of  government  debt  should  be 
temporary, rather than permanent. The government will presumably want to bring debt back 
to its original level, or to some target level, in the long run. Temporary changes in debt might 
therefore be a more relevant policy measure to consider than permanent changes. 
There is also a technical reason why a temporary increase in debt offers some potential 
for escaping from the ineffectiveness result of Proposition 1. With a permanent increase, the 
intercept term in the Taylor Rule eventually has to be increased if we want to keep long-run 
inflation  at  zero.  However,  if  the  increase  is  only  temporary,  it  is  possible  to  leave  the 
intercept term unchanged and still ensure zero steady-state inflation. This suggests that a   25 
temporary increase in debt, under an unchanged Taylor Rule, might also succeed in raising 
output. 
Proposition 4. A one-period government debt increase. An increase in  t b which lasts 
for only one period will cause a temporary (one-period) increase in output and inflation, if 
all the parameters of the Taylor Rule are left unchanged.  
Suppose debt is increased from zero to some positive value in period t, and then is 
returned  to  zero  in  period  t+1  and  held  there  ever  after.  It  follows  that,  for  period  t+1 
onwards, the economy is back in the original steady state from which it started in period t-1, 
before the debt increase. In other words period-(t+1) and later variables are unaffected by a 
one-period  debt  increase  and  only  period-t  variables  will  change.  This  is  due  to  the 
completely ‘forward-looking’ nature of the equilibrium under a Taylor Rule. Look again at 
the  economy’s  laws  of  motion,  (31)-(33).  By  the  argument  just  made  we  may  treat                   
( 1 1 1 ˆ ,, t t t yi     ) as exogenous in these. The equilibrium in period t then reduces to the solution 
of two equations in which the only unknowns are  ( , ) tt y  . These are shown below as (35) 
and (36). They are obtained by substituting out  ˆ
t i  as t from (31) and (32) and regrouping 
terms. 
  1 (1 )[(1 ) ] t R t t ry             (35) 
  11 () tt y           
  1 [ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) ] R t R R t t r y r r b          
            (36) 
By the reasoning above, we observe that the left-hand sides of these equations are exogenous. 
(35) and (36) can be loosely interpreted as ‘short-run aggregate supply’ (SRAS) and 
‘short-run  aggregate  demand’  (SRAD)  equations,  respectively.  This  is  because  (35)  still 
mainly  derives  from  the  ‘NKPC’  equation  and  (36)  still  mainly  derives  from  the  ‘IS’ 
equation. Although some of the composite coefficients on the right-hand-side variables are at 
first  sight  ambiguous  in  sign,  in  fact  we  may  resolve  all  of  them  to  be  positive  under 
reasonable assumptions, as Appendix F demonstrates. These equations can then be depicted 
in a familiar textbook manner:   26 
   
 
It is now easy to see that, so long as q < 1 and thus  > 0, an increase in  t b will shift the 
SRAD curve to the right, and so will raise current output and inflation.  
Why does a temporary debt increase succeed where a permanent one failed? The reason 
is  that  in  this  case  there  is  no  offsetting  increase  in  the  Taylor  Rule’s  intercept  term. 
Nevertheless,  the  nominal  interest  rate  will  still  rise  (if  we  assume    >  1;  see  again 
Proposition 2), because t rises. However, it will not rise by enough to choke off the boom. It 
would of course be possible to use monetary policy to choke off the boom, by accompanying 
the fiscal expansion by a one-period increase in the Taylor Rule’s intercept term,  t i . The 
point here is simply that it is now not necessary to increase the intercept term in order to 
ensure zero long-run inflation. 
To study a temporary increase in debt which lasts for more than one period, we turn to 
numerical  simulation.  As  above,  the  parameters  of  the  Taylor  Rule  are  left  completely 
unchanged.  Figure  4  shows  the  case  of  an  increase  in  debt  which  lasts  for  exactly  four 
periods. All other parameter values are identical to those in the earlier non-linear simulations. 
Again there is a short-run boom in output and inflation. An interesting feature is that the time 
path of output is hump-shaped, despite the fact that the level of debt is constant during the 
first four periods. By comparing it with the same simulation for a one-period debt increase 
(not shown), we can also say that the size of the boom in the first period is larger. 
Making  the  increase  in  government  debt  temporary  thus  provides  a  second  way  to 
escape  from  our  earlier  fiscal  ineffectiveness  result.  As  argued  above,  this  point  is  also 
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smooth  out  the  effects  of  temporary  business  cycle  shocks,  and  thus  to  make  temporary 
changes to the debt itself. The study of permanent changes nevertheless remains important to 
the extent that governments may not always be able to credibly commit to making only 
temporary changes. In practice, changes in debt have often been very long-lasting. 
 
4. Fiscal Policy When Monetary Policy is Governed by a Money-Supply Rule 
In this section, we replace the Taylor Rule by a rule which makes the monetary growth 
rate the exogenous instrument of monetary policy: 
  1 t t t mm    . 
Presently we will assume that t = 0 in all periods, i.e. that the money supply is pegged at a 
constant value; but to show how t enters the equations we begin with the more general case. 
The  economy’s  laws  of  motion  under  this  regime  are  still  given  by  (31)  and  (32). 
However the Taylor Rule, (33), is replaced by: 
  1 1 1 1 ˆˆ ˆ () t t R t t t t i i r y y           .  (37) 
This is just the first-differenced version of the LM equation, (26). We now note that (31), 
(32) and (37) constitute a system of three simultaneous first-order difference equations, i.e. a 
third-order system. The variables in this system, (t, yt,  ˆ
t i ), all appear at first sight to be non-
predetermined, as was the case under a Taylor Rule. However, although this is true of each 
variable individually, it is not true of them jointly. To see this, add pt-1 to both sides of (26) 




t t R t t t y r i m p 

     .  (38) 
As of period t, the RHS of (38) is clearly predetermined, and thus a linear combination of (t, 
yt,  ˆ
t i ) is predetermined. This means there are only two degrees of freedom in the way the 
state variables can ‘jump’ if an unexpected shock occurs. Our third-order system is hence 
equivalent to a system with one predetermined and two non-predetermined state variables.   28 
The fact  that there is  now a predetermined variable means  that the economy  will not in 
general jump straight to its new steady state when there is a permanent shock. This already 
suggests that, under a money supply rule, the short-run impact of an increase in government 
debt is unlikely to be the same as the long-run impact. More precisely, we can show that: 
Proposition 5. A permanent government debt increase under a money supply rule. 
If  the  money  supply  is  held  constant,  then:  (i)  a  determinate,  bounded,  perfect-foresight 
solution  exists  with  no  additional  parameter  restrictions;  (ii)  a  permanent  debt  increase 
unambiguously raises short-run output, relative both to its new steady-state value and to its 
original steady-state value. 
To prove part (i), we need to demonstrate that, under a regime of a constant money 
supply ( ˆt   = 0 for all t), of the three eigenvalues of the system (31), (32) and (37), two lie 
outside the unit circle and one lies inside. Moreover we can show that the stable eigenvalue 
lies in the interval (0,1). Hence, following a shock, the economy converges gradually and 
monotonically to its new steady state. To prove part (ii), we need to show that the multiplier 




,  (39) 
giving the impact effect of a permanent increase in debt on output relative to its effect on new 
steady-state output, is positive. Recall from Proposition 1 that, in the case of the Taylor Rule, 
this multiplier equals zero. In the present case we can show that it is positive with only mild 
extra conditions as sufficient conditions (in particular, that  be close to zero). Under this 
more  traditional  monetary  policy  regime,  therefore,  a  permanent  debt  increase 
unambiguously causes a boom.
10 
An illustration of this is provide d in Figure 5. Here we chart the outcomes of a 
numerical simulation identical to that used for Figure 1, except that a constant money supply 
replaces the Taylor Rule. It is interesting to note that the nominal interest rate ‘overshoots’ its 
new steady-state level. This is in contrast to what happens under the Taylor Rule with inertia 
(Figure 2). Despite this overshoot, the short-run effect on output is a boom and not a slump. 
                                                 
10 The proofs of the results reported in this paragraph are relatively heavy on algebra. For reasons of length we 
omit them from the paper but they are available on request. The proof furthermore shows that dy1/db > 0, i.e. 
that output in the impact period rises also relative to its original value.   29 
The reason for this is that the real interest rate actually falls on impact, due to the rise in the 
inflation rate, as can also be seen in the figure. Hence it is not generally true that a permanent 
debt  increase  will  only  boost  short-run  output  if  the  upward  adjustment  of  the  nominal 
interest rate is delayed, contrary to the impression which might be gained from section 3.2. 
Rather, the crucial requirement is that the upward adjustment of the real interest rate should 
be delayed. 
Why does the constant  money supply rule delay the upward adjustment of the real 
interest rate whereas the basic Taylor Rule does not? A key point about any Taylor Rule is 
that it allows the money supply to ‘jump’. This is because, as is well known, the nominal 
interest rate and the money stock are linked through the money demand function, so that the 
authorities cannot choose arbitrary paths for both variables: if the nominal interest rate is 
determined by the Taylor Rule, the money supply must become endogenous. We know that a 
permanent increase in government debt must increase the real and nominal interest rates in 
the new zero-inflation steady state, and that the higher nominal interest rate must reduce the 
new steady-state equilibrium level of real money balances. Under the Taylor Rule, this lower 
level of real balances can be achieved instantly by a downward jump in the money supply 
with no change in the price level; but under a constant money supply rule, it can only be 
achieved by an increase in the price level.
 However, with staggered price-setting, such an 
increase  in  the  price  level  takes  time.  By  contrast,  the  Taylor  Rule  ‘bypasses’  the  price 
stickiness in the model by allowing the money supply to jump.
11  
In the case of a temporary increase in government debt, the difference in outcomes 
under a Taylor Rule and a money supply rule is much less marked. Figure 6 is the counterpart 
of Figure 4 and shows the effects of a debt increase which lasts for exactly four periods, but 
now assuming that the money supply is held constant. All other parameter values in this 
simulation are the same. The responses of output, inflation, the nominal interest rate and real 
money balances are notably similar. 
 
                                                 
11 A comparison of Figures 1 and 5 clearly shows the different speeds of adjustment of both nominal and real 
money balances under the two policies.   30 
  6. Conclusions 
Our  general  conclusion  is  that  the  effectiveness  of  government  debt  for  demand 
management is  highly sensitive to  the monetary policy  rule. The standard way  to  model 
monetary policy in recent years has been to assume a Taylor Rule. The most basic type of 
Taylor Rule, however, completely neutralises the ability of a permanent increase in debt to 
raise short-run output. Government debt can be used effectively within a Taylor Rule regime, 
but care needs to be exercised over how this is done: either a temporary peg of the nominal 
interest rate is needed, or some inertia in the Taylor Rule; alternatively, the increase in debt 
should be chosen to be temporary rather than permanent. If, on the other hand, the monetary 
policy rule is to set an exogenous path for the money supply, then a permanent increase in 
debt will increase short-run output without additional qualifications. 
These findings are particularly relevant in a period of history such as the recent one. 
During the ‘credit crunch’ recession of 2008-9, many governments ran large budget deficits 
and dramatically increased government debt levels in a deliberate attempt to provide ‘fiscal 
stimulus’  to  counteract  the  recession.  Such  a  concerted  attempt  to  use  fiscal  policy  for 
demand  management  had  not  been  seen  since  the  1970s.  Our  analysis  implies  that  such 
policies  would  have  been  futile  if  central  banks  had  not  cooperated  in  keeping  nominal 
interest rates low (at almost zero, in fact) while the fiscal stimulus was in progress. 
In this paper we have focused on the ‘positive’ rather than the ‘normative’ effects of 
government debt. Being a DGE model, our model also has implications for the effects of debt 
on  welfare,  since  the  impact  on  the  underlying  lifetime  utility  levels  of  agents  can  be 
investigated. However in an overlapping-generations model it is less straightforward to look 
at welfare than in a so-called ‘representative agent’ model, because different generations are 
affected differently by policy. A social welfare function is needed in order to assess optimal 
policy, and this raises subtle issues which take us beyond our present scope. A careful study 
of  the  welfare  implications  of  the  use  of  government  debt  for  demand  management  we 
therefore leave for future work. 
 Appendix A  The Aggregate Demand Function for Labour 
By inverting firm i’s production function we may write its demand for labour as a 
function of its output: 
1/
it it LY
  . Yit is demand-determined and given by (12). If firm i last 
changed its price j periods ago, then Pit = Xt-j, so that firm i’s demand for labour is: 
  ( / ) it t j t t L X P Y
 
  .  (A1) 
The  proportion  of firms  who last  changed  their  price j periods ago is  (1-)
j. Summing 
across j = 0,...,, we then obtain aggregate labour demand as: 
 
/ 1/
0(1 ) ( / )
j
t j t j t t L X P Y
   

    .  (A2) 
If we define 
//
0 [ (1 ) ]
j
t j t j PX
    
  
     this can also be written in the form: 
 
1/ / ( / ) t t t t L Y P P
    ,  (A3) 
which yields the LHS of (19). 
 
Appendix B  The Underlying Loglinearised Equations 
 and the Derivation of the Partially-Reduced Form of the Model 
  1 ( ) (1 ) t t t t p p p x       ,  (A4) 
 
1 1 1
1 (1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 / ) [ (1/ 1)( )] t R t R R t t t x r x r r w p y       
  
            ,
  (A5) 
 
1( 1) t t t t w p y z   
     ,  (A6) 
  t t t y c g  ,  (A7) 
  t t t t z m p c    ,  (A8) 
 
1ˆ
t R t z r i
  ,  (A9)   2 
  1 ˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 1/ ) t R t R t R t a r a r r r v           ,  (A10) 
  1 ˆ ˆ t t t ri   ,  (A11) 
  1 ttt pp    ,  (A12) 




  ,  (A14) 
  1 t t t t v m p b      ,  (A15) 
 
1 1 1
11 (1 ) (1 )[(1 ) ] t t R R t t t t g r r b b m m   
  
          .  (A16) 
Government  spending  and  taxation  are  zero  in  the  reference  steady  state,  so  their  log -
deviations are not well defined. Hence we define gt  Gt/YR, t  Tt/YR. 
To derive the NKPC equation, (24), we first use (A6) to eliminate wt from (A5): 
 
1
1 (1 ) t R t x r x 

   
 
1 1 1 (1 )[ (1 / ) ( / 1) (1 / ) ] R t t t r p y z           
              .  (A17) 
Next, we ‘quasi-difference’ the price-index equation, (A4), to the same pattern as the LHS of 
(A17). That is, we advance (A4) by one period, multiply through the original equation by 
1(1 ) R r 
   and then subtract the latter from the former. This gives: 
 
11
1 1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )[ (1 ) ] t R t t R t t R t p r p p r p x r x    

            .  (A18) 
(A17) can now be used to eliminate the x variables from (A18). The p variables can then be 
grouped such that they can be replaced by  variables, which yields (24). 
To derive the IS equation, (25), we substitute (A11), (A13) and (A14) into (A10). Then 
we use (A7), with gt set to zero, to replace ct by yt. 
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Appendix C  The Algebra of the Steady-State Solution 
To solve for the steady state we use the system (31) and (32). This is a slightly more 
reduced form of the system (24)-(27). Its derivation is described in the main text. Setting 
variables to time-invariant values in (31) and (32), and also setting  = 0, we obtain a pair of 
equations in (y, ˆ i ). Solving these then yields the steady-state solutions (29) and (30). 
The common denominator of (29) and (30), namely the bracketed term {.}, is at first 
sight  of  indeterminate  sign.  Here  we  show  that  the  sign  is  in  fact  negative.  Using  the 
definitions of the composite parameters already introduced, we may re-express two of the 
terms which appear inside {.} as follows: 
 
(1 )(1 1/ )( / 1)
(1 ) 1 [ (1 ) 1]
1 (1 )(1 1/ )
RR rr




     
  
,  (A19) 
 
2
11 (1 )(1 1/ ) / 1
[ (1 ) 1] [ (1 ) 1]
1 (1 )(1 1/ )
R R R R r r r r
   
   

   
     
  
.  (A20) 
Recall that 0 < , < 1 and , > 1. Moreover in the main text we saw that 1+rR > 1/ when q 
< 1. Hence both the expressions in (A19) and (A20) are negative. It then follows that the 
common denominator, {.}, in (29) and (30) is also negative. 
 
Appendix D  Determinacy of Equilibrium Under a Taylor Rule 
The characteristic equation of the system (31)-(33) can be computed as: 
 
2 0 a b c     ,  (A21) 
where  denotes an eigenvalue, a = 1 and 
   
1 (1 ) 1 [( / 1) / ] RR b r r           
             , 
   
1 (1 ) [1 ( / 1) ( / ) ][ (1 ) ] [ (1 ) / ] R R R R R c r r r r r              
           . 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for both eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle 














.  (A23) 
First, consider the sign  of the common denominator a-b+c. By manipulation of the 
terms for b and c, we can obtain: 
  (2 )[1 (1 ) ] RR a b c r r          
    
1 (1 ) [1 (1 )][( / 1) / ] R R R r r r           
           
  
1 [( / 1) / 1/ ] RR rr      
    .  (A24) 
We now claim that a-b+c > 0 for  sufficiently close to zero. As   0, 1+rR  
-1, as was 
shown in the main text (see the discussion of (23)). This implies that    0 (from the 
definition of ). Hence the term on the first line of (A24)  (1+
-1)2, which is positive. 
Concerning the term on the second line of (A24), note that - is always positive (from the 
definitions of  and ). The term {.} at first sight has an ambiguous sign. However, as   0, 
 remains strictly positive, while   0 (see the definitions of  and ). Therefore {.} is 
unambiguously positive for  sufficiently close to zero. Concerning the term on the third line 
of (A24), we note that it is always positive. This set of observations proves our claim. 
Second, consider the sign of c-a, the numerator of (A23). We can write c-a as: 
  
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) R R R c a r r r 
         
   
1 (1 )[( / 1) / ] RR rr         
       
  
1 [( / 1) / 1/ ] RR rr       
  .  (A25) 
We now claim that c-a > 0 for  sufficiently close to zero. As   0, 1+rR  
-1, as was 
shown in the main text (see the discussion of (23)). This implies that    0 (from the 
definition of ). Hence the term on the first line of (A25)  
-1(1-), which is positive. The 
term on the second line of (A25) at first sight has an ambiguous sign. However, as   0,  
remains  strictly positive, while    0 (see the definitions  of  and ). Therefore {.} is   5 
unambiguously positive for  sufficiently close to zero. Concerning the term on the third line 
of (A25), we note that it is always positive. This set of observations proves our claim. 
From the foregoing it follows that, for  sufficiently close to zero, condition (A23) is 
satisfied with no further parameter restrictions. It also follows that, for  sufficiently close to 
zero, condition (A22) will be satisfied if and only if a+b+c > 0. Now, eliminating (,,) 
using their definitions, with some manipulation we can express a+b+c as: 
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.  (A26) 
a+b+c is clearly positive if and only if the term on the second line is positive. Thus, for  
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.  (A27) 
As the probability of price non-adjustment, , increases,  falls and so the critical value of  
for determinacy increases. Condition (A27) is sketched in the diagram in the main text which 
illustrates Proposition 2. 
 
Appendix E  Equations and Calibration of the Non-Linear Model 
The  non-linear  model  that  we  use  in  the  simulations  is  described  by  the  following 
equations. (Some symbols here have different definitions from those in the main text. This is 
noted where relevant.) 
Household sector 
The household sector is described by the aggregation of the first-order conditions of the 
household’s problem, that is 
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where mt  Mt/Pt and t  Pt/Pt-1. 
Prices 
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.  (A30) 
where xt  Xt/Pt and wt  Wt/Pt. 
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Aggregate labour demand 
Aggregate labour demand is given by 
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 is an index of the price dispersion in period t. Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2007) show that st is bounded below by one, so that st represents the resource costs 
due to relative price dispersion under the Calvo mechanism. Indeed, the higher st, the more 
labour is needed to produce a given level of output. Note that st does not affect the real 
variables up to  the first order if inflation is zero in  steady state (see Ascari, 2004). The 
dynamics of st can be written in a recursive formulation as 
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.  (A33) 
Government sector 
Fiscal policy is described by (17), that using mt  Mt/Pt, can be written as 
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where   is the inflation target of the central bank.  
General equilibrium conditions 
To close the model, we just need to add the goods market equilibrium condition (18) 
  t t t Y C G ,  (18) 
the definition of the auxiliary variable Z 
  / t t t Z m C  ,  (A36) 
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The model is then composed of the following 16 equations: (4)-(6), (18), (20), (A28)-
(A38), that describe the dynamics of the following 16 variables: Ct, Zt, Lt, Vt, rt, it, wt, xt, t, 
t, Yt, t, st, mt, Tt, t. 
It is immediate to note that there is only one state variable: st. Moreover its steady state 
depends just on the steady state value of the inflation rate, since 
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s .  (A39) 
Hence, an immediate jump to the new steady state where the value of   does not change is 
compatible with the inertial adjustment of st implied by (A33), since st simply does not move 
at all. 
Calibration 
q = 1-1/120, such that the expected working life is 30 years, as in Leith and Wren-Lewis 
(2006).  = 0.75,  = 1,  = 10,  = (0.96)
0.25,  = 0.01,  = 2,  = 1.5, while  is calibrated 
such that Y is normalized to 1 in a zero-inflation steady state where  0 BG  . In the policy 
experiments,   = 1,  0 BG   in the initial steady state; then  B  increases unexpectedly to 
0.01. 
 
Appendix F  Signs of the Coefficients in Equations (35) and (36) 
(i) 1-. From what was noted in the main text, as   0,   0. This is sufficient to ensure 
1- > 0, but we also need to check that  remains in the range which ensures determinacy. 
From (A27), the critical value above which  must lie for determinacy tends to 1 as   0. 
Hence for any given  > 1, for  sufficiently close to 0, both 1- > 0 and determinacy hold. 
(ii) (1+rR)-. From what was noted in the main text, as q  1, (1+rR)-  1. (1+rR)- 
is therefore positive for q sufficiently close to 1.   9 
(iii)  1 (1 ) RR rr    
    . From what was noted in the main text, as   0, ,  0 while 
,rR  tend  to  strictly  positive,  finite  values.  Hence  1 (1 ) RR rr    
      is  positive  for  
sufficiently close to 0. 
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